Don't HTTPS Your Onions
Posted on 20 Dec 2017 by Matt TraudtLast upated 27 Dec 2017 at 2:22 pm
Unless you're an edge case (which you aren't).
- Why you would want HTTPS
- Okay, but ...
- Final thoughts
Why you would want HTTPS
Let's talk about why you normally want HTTPS. Let me know if I missed something.
You already get this with Tor.
Everything between your local Tor client (using Tor Browser? It runs Tor in the background) and the Tor client providing the onion service is encrypted. No Tor relay and no network-level adversary can tell what onion service you are visiting (which is actually better than what HTTPS-without-Tor to a regular website would get you).
If you're an onion service operator and you're at the sophistication level of taking advice from random blogs on the Internet, HTTPS doesn't help you here. If you're Facebook, Reddit, or YouTube, then you have a sizable datacenter(s) and are probably no longer running Tor on the same machines as your webservers. Unencrypted traffic may be flowing over an uncomfortable distance on your (super secure, right?) network. Maybe you want HTTPS. But you also have the resources to get a valid certificate for your onion. So do that.
Avoid men in the middle
You already get this with Tor. This is related, but distinct from the previous point.
When you connect to reddit.com with HTTPS, how do you know no one is MitM'ing you? The certificate is valid, right? No big scary browser errors. For better or for worse, we trust the Certificate Authority (CA) system.
When you connect to an onion service, how do you know no one is MitM'ing you? Easy. It's impossible. The bad guy would have to be in your browser (more accurately: between the browser part of Tor Browser and the Tor process it runs in the background) or between the Tor process the onion service operator is running and the webserver it's pointing at. If you assume your Tor Browser hasn't been compromised, and you assume the onion service is being run intelligently, then a MitM attack is impossible. (And if the onion service isn't being run intelligently, can you really trust its operator to do HTTPS intelligently?)
Tie the website to a trusted name
Better solution: encourage the use of bookmarks.
If you create a web game and self-signed certificate for 5rqvahiexxwm4p6m.onion and you want your users to know they are connecting to the real web game, tell them to use a bookmark. The bad guy can also generate a self-signed certificate. The bad guy can also generate a similar onion service name (making an arbitrary 8 characters match should be rather trivial these days). No one is checking every character matches what they expect every time. They just glace at best. And if they glance too fast, the bad guy successfully spoofed your hostname and your website's bad, self-signed certificate behavior. Your certificate added nothing of value.
Quick. Which of the following is the real DuckDuckGo onion service?
(And assume both use self-signed certificates)
Only 5 characters match exactly, and 6 more are in the same "class" (I replaced the real letter with another short letter [like 'n'] or another letter with a tail [like 'g']). The remaining 5 are random.
An attacker has a lot of wiggle room. And I do not believe vanity addresses (such as "coolgamez2f89e4r.onion") help. If it was easy for you to generate an address that starts with "coolgamez", then it's easy for everyone else. In fact, if your adversary is significantly more powerful than you, they, might even try matching some of those random characters at the end. Finally, it may be lulling your users into a false sense of security. They may be only looking for the "coolgamez" prefix.
So invalid certifcates do nothing to help tie your onion address to a trusted name.
See also the related discussion elsewhere on the Internet regarding Let's Encrypt and domains doing Bad Things. Let's Encrypt will happily give you a certificate for g0ogle.com if you can prove you own the domain. I think that's fine, I just want to point out the parallels. All a (valid) DV certificate gets you is proof that you are connecting securely to some domain. It doesn't prove you're connecting to the domain you intended. You need an EV certificate for that, and for your users to actually look at the address bar.
Okay, but ...
So you still want HTTPS for some reason. Okay. Don't get an invalid or self-signed cert. Seriously.
No one checks them
There's probably about 10 people out of 7 billion that can honestly claim they check the certificates they get every time they visit websites. Those 10 people aren't visiting your onion service. So for who are you adding this broken and invalid certificate? No one. So no one will notice when it changes when the impossible MitM happens.
It teaches bad habits
Invalid certificates produce big scary warnings in browsers. And they should. Something very fishy (or phishy) could be going on. We you add a self-signed or invalid certificate to your onion service, you are training users to
- expect HTTPS when it isn't even necessary
- click through big dangerous warnings
- believe brokenHTTPS-over-onion is better than just http-over-onion
That's not okay. Please stop.
It's just for me
The onion service is just a private thing for you? Great. Do whatever you want, but don't pretend you're making your service more secure. If you want your thing to be secure, you run Tor on the same box as the service it is onion-izing and you secure that box. A self-signed certificate on top of that is just added work and added headache every time you visit your site.
I have a valid .com certificate and want to present it for my .onion
See: No one checks certificates. We already covered this.
No one is actually going to check the certificate is the same when they visit the regular website as when they visit the onion service. You're training your users to expect a certificate that won't validate for a mismatched hostname, and they aren't going to notice when the certificate stops being yours and changes to the bad guy's instead.
I can actually get a valid certificate for my .onion
Nice! Depending on how important of an onion service you are running, I'm still tempted to claim you don't need it. If you're datacenter-scale, then I think you should. If you're just about anything else, it's pointless.
Maybe someday Let's Encrypt will offer free valid certificates for onion services. If that happens, then my opinion half changes. It's still most likely unnecessary for security reasons. But if you run a game forum and can get both coolgamez.com and coolgamezxxxxxxx.onion in the same certificate, that's pretty cool. That actually means something.